City 12, Bishop 0



On January 4 a decision about the legality of the Our Lady Of Hope Historic District was handed down by U. S. District Judge Michael A. Ponsor. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield (Most Reverend Timothy McDonnell) had contested the creation of the district on many fronts. Ponsor considered two of the Bishop's complaints "not ripe" for adjudication. The other ten were dismissed.

[links to previous court papers are here]
[link to the full decision is here]
[link to our "plain english" count-by-count summary is here]

Outline of the Decision:
I. Introduction, p. 1
II. Facts
        A. The Parties, p. 3
        B. Closing the Our Lady Of Hope Church, p. 4
        C. The “Our Lady of Hope Historic District”, p. 8
III. Discussion, p. 12
        A. The Summary Judgment Standard, p. 13
        B. Ripeness, p. 14
                    1. Creation Of A Single-Parcel Historic District, p. 15
                                a. administrative burden
                                b. unfavorable treatment burden
                    2. Preventing Plaintiff From Deconsecrating Church, p. 17
        C. Claims Against Individual Defendants, p. 25
        D. RLUIPA, p. 25
                    1. substantial burden (Count 9), p. 25
                    2. equal terms (Count 8), p. 36
                    3. nondiscrimination ( Count 8), p. 43
                    4. unreasonable limitation (Count 10), p. 44          
        E. Remaining Federal Claims
                    1. free exercise (Count 1), p. 45
                    2. establishment (Count 1), p. 50
                    3. equal protection (Count 5), p. 53
                    4. due process (Count 7), p. 53
        F. State Claims
                    1. free exercise (Count 2), p. 54
                    2. equal protection (Count 6), p. 55
                    3. civil rights (Count 11), p. 55
                    4. declaratory judgment (Count 12), p. 55
IV. Conclusion, p. 55

our short summary of the memorandum is below:

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANTS’ CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
January 4, 2011
PONSOR, D.J.

I. INTRODUCTION
This lawsuit places the court at the intersection of two important, protected rights: the right of a religious entity to manage its places of worship in accordance with church law without oversight by secular authorities, and the right of the larger community to have a role in the preservation of a beloved landmark that was once a church.

In this case, Plaintiff Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield challenges, as unenforceable, a local ordinance that might result in the imposition of architectural restrictions on Our Lady of Hope Church in downtown Springfield, Massachusetts. Services terminated at Our Lady of Hope in January 2010, and the ordinance in question, Section 2.46.030(G) of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Springfield (“the Ordinance”), would require Plaintiff to submit to oversight by the Springfield Historical Commission before altering physical aspects of the church building, possibly including sacred religious iconography.

The complaint sets forth twelve counts alleging, inter alia, that the Ordinance violates provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), as well as Plaintiff’s right to the free exercise of religion under the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

Plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts, seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief that would invalidate the Ordinance. Defendants have filed a cross motion for summary judgment, asking the court to declare that Plaintiff is obliged to comply with the Ordinance by filing a timely application with the Springfield Historical Commission before attempting to alter or demolish any exterior architectural features of the church. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 14) will be denied, and Defendants’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 22) will be allowed.

It is important to emphasize at the outset that a significant portion of the court’s rationale is anchored on the doctrine of ripeness. The sum and substance of this ruling is this: the Ordinance’s requirement that Plaintiff submit a plan for review violates neither statutory nor constitutional law. If a plan should be formulated and submitted pursuant to the Ordinance, the response of the Historical Commission may change the constitutional picture significantly and entitle Plaintiff to further judicial consideration....

[...50 pages later...]

. . . a mainstay of this analysis is the fact that the case arises in the absence of any submission pursuant to the Ordinance. If such a submission were made, the Historical Commission’s response might, or might not, alter the analysis in a future legal challenge.

What can be said with certainty now, however, is that no constitutional or statutory rights of Plaintiff [Bishop] have been or are being violated. It is, one hopes, not beyond possibility that wise and respectful discussions might lead to a resolution of the controversy around Our Lady of Hope Church that will be satisfactory to all concerned.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby ALLOWED in its entirety, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED in its entirety. The clerk will enter judgment for Defendants [City].

This case may now be closed.

[link to the full decision is here]

The Bishop Gets a "Shellacking" (Counts 1-4)

Below is a "plain english" count-by-count summary which compresses the arguments and deletes footnotes and citations (the full 56 page decision is here).

First, we consider WHAT THE BISHOP SAID about suing individuals in addition to the municipality: "In its complaint, RCB [The Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield] included allegations of particular actions by the individual defendants tending to show that they purposefully targeted RCB  as a religious entity because of its religiously-motivated decision to close the OLOH Parish and to discontinue regular worship services at OLOH Church contrary to the wishes of many parishioners. The implications of that conduct, which may be a disputed issue of fact, clearly go to the liability of the individual defendants regardless of whether such intentions or conduct should be imputed to the City...accordingly...the claims against those individuals should not be dismissed at this state of the litigation."

WHAT THE CITY SAID: "Claims against named individuals are redundant and should be dismissed . . . suits against municipal agents in their official capacities are actually suits against the municipality. . . ."

WHAT THE JUDGE SAID:"Individual Defendants correctly argue that Plaintiff’s claims against them are redundant because suits against municipal agents in their official capacities are actually suits against the municipality...In its complaint, Plaintiff makes clear that it is suing the Individual Defendants in their official capacities, and Plaintiff fails to offer any reason why this suit should not proceed only against the City itself. The court will, therefore, allow Defendants’ motion on all counts as to all Individual Defendants."

COMMENTARY:
"The people were astonished at his teaching, for he taught them as one having authority and not as the scribes."

The Catholic religion relies on the hope and trust of individuals in the moral authority of Jesus Christ. The daily Mass texts—expressing wonderment, prayers and praise—as in the quote above from Jan. 11, confirm a basically hopeful attitude toward living in the world, despite the pain of the world, helping us believe that pain does not triumph, and that light wins out over dark.

What does this have to do with the Bishop's desire to charge individual defendants, in addition to the City? Simply that it was a dark attempt at coercion and punishment. Thankfully, a failed one.

The Bishop, through his legal representatives, went to the public hearing about the proposed OLOH ordinance. Instead of offering testimony, and the force of truth based on a self-evident authority, he demanded an exception to civil law. Then, when things weren't going his way, he threatened. Later, when the Historic District was created, he vowed to get revenge. Although nothing in the subsequent lawsuit justified or explained his actions (as noted by Judge Ponsor), he targeted individuals as well as the City itself.

Let us be clear: this is nothing more or less than bullying.

What is not generally known is that under the rules of the federal RLUIPA laws, should the RCB have won, all the litigation fees of both parties would have been paid by the losers. These are not small fees. While the City of Springfield would probably have been the first recourse for liability,  the prospect of even one moderately well-off homeowner (as most of the city councilors no doubt are) becoming liable for large legal fees must have been a daunting one. Of course, that could never happen, because cities don't go bankrupt, right? Not so fast. Here's what the Boston Globe had to say about Springfield's finances in 2007:

The city has spent the past several years clawing its way from a morass of public corruption and near bankruptcy. But a state-appointed board that has overseen Springfield's finances since 2004 -- when the city had a $41 million deficit and was close to bankruptcy -- has balanced the city's books and raised its credit rating from junk bond status.

In short, the threat of financial ruin that Bishop McDonnell, through his agents at Egan, Flanagan and Cohen, P.C., made toward the councilors was not idle. It should go without saying (but, apparently, it needs to be said) that such hateful, cynical, bullying tactics are very far removed from the gospel values that the bishops of the Roman Catholic Church are expected to uphold.  Thankfully, the city representatives resisted the threat and rose to the occasion. Both the city council and the historic commission votes were unanimous.

Above all, city councilor Rosemarie Mazza-Moriarty rose to the occasion, because as a parishioner of OLOH she was outspoken in urging the designation to save the church from threatened demolition. She also criticized the Pastoral Planning process itself, asserting that rank-and-file parishioners were left out. These positions earned her a special bulls-eye and the distinction of being singled out on page 9 of the Bishop's complaint.

This idea of "naming names" and targeting individual Catholics for public admonishing may be a trend. Archbishop Vigneron has issued a spiritual bad-weather advisory against traveling to Detroit for the American Catholic Conference on June 10-12. His color brochure calls out Hans Kung, Kathleen Kennedy Townsend, James Carroll, Dr. Jennette Rodriguez, Rosemary Radford Ruether, Dr. Anthony Padovano, and Sister Joan Chittister for daring to speak at the conference.

In Phoenix, Bishop Olmstead announced a very public excommunication for Sister Margaret McBride of St. Joseph's Medical Center, a hospital formerly known as Catholic. In Rhode Island, Bishop Tobin is also naming names, among them Patrick Kennedy, Lincoln Chaffee, and other political leaders who favor gay rights. Bishops seem quick to target, call out and excommunicate women who aspire to be priests, but not so quick to target, call out and excommunicate priests who...............you can fill in the rest.

Now that the suit is over, what about those litigation fees from Egan, Flanagan and Cohen, P.C.?

It would be fair for all parishioners in the Springfield Diocese to know what those fees are, since it is they, ultimately, who pick up the tab. Yet the Diocese, acting in perfect conformity to the worst tendencies of its "corporate sole" character, continues to stonewall on financial matters. No one has a clue about the cost of this ill-advised suit.

I have it on good authority that this information, though darkly hidden at the moment, will one day come to light.

Count 1 and Count 2

WHAT THE BISHOP SAID:  Count 1-Violation of the United States Constitution. Free Exercise of Religion and Establishment Clauses.
"Defendants, acting under color of state law, have deprived and continue to deprive the RCB of its right to free exercise of religion...by discriminating against the RCB because of its religious character and by inhibiting its right to freely exercise its religious faith. Defendants, acting under color of state law, have violated the establishment clause...in that the subject single-parcel ordinance does not have a secular purpose, its principal or primary effect inhibits freedom of religion, and it fosters an excessive government entanglement with religion. Defendants' actions were purposely taken with deliberate indifference to the RCB's constitutional and legal rights."
Count 2-Violation of the Massachusetts Constitution. Freedom of Religion and Conscience, and Establishment Clauses.
[same as above for federal charges]

WHAT THE CITY SAID:  "A basic principle of constitutional law is that the First Amendment “free exercise clause embraces two separate concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, …the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that protection.” Laws which regulate conduct rather than speech generally fall outside the First Amendment and into an area over which government enjoys full regulatory power..”…..

…..The Catholic religion does not forbid compliance with the OLOH Historic District Ordinance. Plaintiff will not be subject to substantial pressure to modify his behavior and violate his religious beliefs in order to comply with the OLOH ordinance....Substantial alteration or complete destruction of abandoned religious exterior architectural features, without compliance with the OLOH Ordinance, is not a constitutionally protected form of religious exercise.

. . .Plaintiff presents a grab bag full of allegations designed to have the Court, for federal constitutional purposes, review the OLOH Ordinance under strict scrutiny......the general proposition for addressing the constitutional protection for free exercise of religion established by the Supreme Court is "that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice."...

...This critical distinction between beliefs and conduct is recognized in Massachusetts and used in analyzing the state constitutional scope of religious freedom....It is perfectly lawful to "enact land-use restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and desirable aesthetic features of a city."...

...To determine the object of the OLOH Ordinance we must begin with its text because "the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons." The OLOH Ordinance does not discriminate against religious beliefs or regulate or prohibit conduct undertaken for religious reasons. The OLOH Ordinance does not refer to any of plaintiff's religious practices..."

WHAT THE JUDGE SAID: "... Plaintiff suggests that the Ordinance is not neutral because it creates a “religious gerrymander” by targeting Plaintiff’s property and is not generally applicable because it involves “individualized governmental assessment” of the conduct governed. Plaintiff urges the court to examine the neutrality of the Ordinance itself, arguing that it is not neutral because it applies only to Plaintiff’s property.

Plaintiff’s arguments are unpersuasive largely for the reasons discussed above: they misconceive the nature of the Historic Districts Act. To avoid undue repetition, the court merely notes that the Ordinance represents a finding that Plaintiff’s property falls under the strictures of the Historic Districts Act; the Ordinance has no independent power and any imposition on Plaintiff flows from the Act.

To apply Free Exercise precedent, then, the court must look to the Historic Districts Act itself. The Act sets forth specific criteria for determining which properties it governs....these criteria are undeniably neutral both in appearance and in substance. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40C, § 7 (West 2010) (listing criteria such as “the historic and architectural value and significance of the site, building or structure” and “the general design, arrangement, texture, material and color of the features involved”). Plaintiff does not argue to the contrary.

Plaintiff also alleges that the Ordinance offends the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause because it “does not have a secular purpose, its principal or primary effect inhibits freedom of religion, and it fosters an excessive government entanglement with religion.” ......The Supreme Court has produced a three-part test to elucidate when government action does not engage in the establishment of religion: First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. (Lemon v. Kurtzman)...

Plaintiff has not developed this argument in much detail, and it is clear that no action by Defendant has run afoul of the Establishment Clause.

First...Plaintiff offers no support for its allegation that Defendants passed the Ordinance with an improper motive. Second, it is unclear how, if at all, the Ordinance advances or inhibits religion. Plaintiff’s only conceivable argument is that denial of a certificate of exemption would inhibit religion, but that certainly does not appear to be the Ordinance’s “principal or primary effect.”...... Third, regarding the “excessive entanglement” prong, the only ripe argument available to Plaintiff is that the mere requirement to submit a plan for review would transgress Lemon.

Based on the authorities already cited, this argument, if accepted, would exempt church property from all zoning limitations and is simply not sustainable.... Indeed, even if Plaintiff had gone through the application process and had been denied, it is unlikely that Plaintiff could show that this entanglement was “excessive.”.....For these reasons, Defendants’ motion will be allowed as to Count One.

Plaintiff also challenges the Ordinance under Article 46, Section 1 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts State Constitution. While Massachusetts law grants broader protections to Free Exercise plaintiffs than federal law.....here the alleged burden on Plaintiff’s religious exercise was minimal and, thus, does not establish a cause of action under state law. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion will be allowed as to Count Two."


Count 3 and Count 4

WHAT THE BISHOP SAID:  Count 3-Violation of the United States Constitution. Freedom of Speech, Expression and Assembly.
"Defendants, under color of state law, have deprived and continue to deprive the RCB of its right to speak, express and assemble on matters of religion...by discriminating against the RCB based on the religious nature of its speech and expression, by inhibiting its right to freely speak, express its faith to its congregants and to the community, and inhibiting its freedom of assembly, and by applying a vague and unlawful single-parcel ordinance against them. Defendants' actions were purposely taken with deliberate indifference to the RCB's constitutional and legal rights."
Count 4-Violation of the Massachusetts Constitution. Freedom of Speech, Expression and Assembly. [same as above for federal claim]

WHAT THE CITY SAID:  " …..Springfield did not prohibit all religious exercise anywhere within its municipal boundaries by the plaintiff. In fact, plaintiff admits to circumstances in which the OLOH Historic District Ordinance allows adequate alternative means of religious expression; “the Parish was merged with St. Mary’s Parish, East Springfield, under a new name, St. Mary Mother of Hope Parish.” Merely designating a building as historical is not an infringement of any constitutional right because the designation itself does nothing to restrict religious practice...an issue ordinarily is not ripe for decision until a land owner has requested permission to act and has been denied the right to act, or has suffered actual and present harm as a result of the designation…..

…..Plaintiff’s constitutional claims are based in large part upon the erroneous contention that the OLOH Ordinance purports to control plaintiff’s religious symbols......Simply because the exterior architectural features of the OLOH property may have some “religious content” or promote “a message consistent with a religious doctrine” does not make them “run afoul of the Establishment Clause.” In the context of the OLOH Ordinance, the exterior architectural features have a dual significance partaking of both religion and government…..

….. The OLOH Ordinance does not interfere with plaintiff in the performance of any religious rituals or Catholic ceremonies of worship. The OLOH Ordinance does not suppress the Catholic religion or religious conduct. The OLOH Ordinance neither encourages nor discourages participation in religion. To permit plaintiff to excuse illegal alteration of the exterior architectural features of the OLOH Historic District because of his religious beliefs “would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”…

Limiting the destruction or substantial alteration of the exterior architectural features of the OLOH property is not even a hypothetical infringement of plaintiff’s purported free speech rights. Where, as in this case, the communicative content of the regulated activity–its message---is irrelevant to the government’s reason for regulation then it is conduct, not speech, which is being regulated and the First Amendment values are not implicated…"

WHAT THE JUDGE SAID:  "Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, nothing in the Ordinance or the Historic Districts Act makes an exemption for Our Lady of Hope Church impossible or even unlikely. The Act allows municipalities to grant the following certificates of exemption:

(1) a certificate of appropriateness where the proposed alteration is “appropriate for or compatible with the preservation or protection of the historic district;”
(2) a certificate of nonapplicability where the proposed alteration “does not involve any exterior architectural feature, or involves an exterior architectural feature which is [exempted by this Act];” and
(3) a certificate of hardship where, “owing to conditions especially affecting the building or structure involved, but not affecting the historic district generally, failure to approve an application will involve substantial hardship, financial or otherwise, to the applicant.”

.....The City might well determine that Plaintiff’s circumstances warrant either a certificate of appropriateness or a certificate of hardship. A certificate of hardship seems like a very real possibility, given that the exemption applies to any hardship “financial or otherwise,” id., and Plaintiff makes a strong argument that the inability to deconsecrate the Church would result in religious hardship.

In short, the City’s decision to pass the Ordinance in no way predetermines the outcome of an application for an exemption. Indeed, the Historical Commission’s stated reason for proposing the Ordinance was to prevent the outright demolition of the Church..... It would be perfectly consistent for the City to enact this Ordinance in an effort to stave off the possibility of demolition and later provide an exemption for Plaintiff to remove features of the Church’s facade. In any event, the prospect of refusal is far from certain...

In addition, it is not clear that Plaintiff will even need to file for an exemption. At present, Plaintiff has not decided on a specific plan of action that it will take with respect to its religious symbols.......The court can conceive myriad potential uses of the deconsecrated church building that would not require changes to the building’s facade. With this outcome, the controversy between the parties would disappear. Thus, given that Plaintiff’s claim rests on “uncertain and contingent events that may not occur as anticipated or may not occur at all,”... these facets of Plaintiff’s claims are not fit for review at this time.

As to hardship, Plaintiff’s attempt to prove a burden created by the application process itself is weak and unpersuasive....Moreover, even a showing of more substantial hardship would not suffice to compel the court to address issues that are so clearly unfit for adjudication. Thus, this claim is not ripe for review...

For the sake of clarity, the court emphasizes that this ruling only applies to those claims premised on Plaintiff’s inability to deconsecrate its church. Due to the overlapping nature of Plaintiff’s allegations, this ripeness ruling only eliminates Counts Three and Four in their entirety because Plaintiff’s freedom-of-speech claims derive solely from its alleged inability to remove religious messages from its property...."

(to be continued)

The Bishop Gets a "Shellacking" (Counts 5-8)

Counts 5, 6, and 7

WHAT THE BISHOP SAID: Count 5-Violation of the United States Constitution. Equal Protection.
"Defendants, acting under color of law, have deprived and continue to deprive the RCB of its right to equal protection of the laws..  ...discriminating against the RCB in the adoption, enforcement and application of its ordinances. Defendants' actions were purposely taken with deliberate indifference to the RCB's constitutional and legal rights."
Count 6-Violation of the Massachusetts Constitution. Equal Protection. [same as above for federal]
Count 7-Violation of the United States Constitution. Due Process.
"Defendants,  under color of state law, have deprived and continue to deprive the RCB of due process of law... by denying the RCB use of its property based on an irrational and discriminatory motivation. Defendants' actions were purposely taken with deliberate indifference to the RCB's constitutional and legal rights."

WHAT THE CITY SAID:  "…..In 1898, plaintiff transformed itself into a “body politic and corporation sole” and thereby became “subject to all the liabilities and limitations imposed by the Public Statutes.”...Plaintiff does not challenge the OLOH Historic District to use the OLOH site exclusively for religious purposes. Although the plaintiff retains title to the OLOH property, it is no longer used as a place of sacred worship. In fact, plaintiff admits that “the Our Lady of Hope Church was closed”, its assets “were transferred” and “the Church [is] out of service with respect to religious worship.”…..

...the purpose of the Historic District Act and the OLOH Ordinance fit "easily within the established boundaries of 'benevolent neutrality,' in which religious exercise is supported but not promoted" and afford no basis to conclude that the legislative intent was to advance religion...

...the court should look at the specific public interests at stake in creating the OLOH Ordinance. The Historic District Ordinance limits destruction or substantial alteration of the exterior of OLOH property without prior permission of the Springfield Historical Commission. An individual's religious beliefs do not "excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct than the State is free to regulate. On the contrary, the record of more than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that proposition."

WHAT THE JUDGE SAID:  "The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. Because Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence of unequal treatment, Defendants’ motion will be allowed as to Count Five." (emphasis in original)

"Because Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence of unequal treatment, Defendants’ motion will be allowed as to Count Six."

"Plaintiff has not explained how the Ordinance deprives it of life, liberty, or property. See U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. Thus, Defendants’ motion will be allowed as to Count Seven."

Count 8

WHAT THE BISHOP SAID: Count 8-Violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act of 2000. Discrimination on the Basis of Religion
"Defendants, under color of law, have deprived and continue to deprive the RCB of its right to be free from religious discrimination - as secured by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act - by treating them on less than equal terms as a nonreligious assembly or institution, by imposing and implementing a land use regulation that discriminates against them on the basis of religion, and by unreasonably limiting RCB's religious assemblies, institutions, and structures. Defendants' actions were purposely taken with deliberate indifference to the RCB's constitutional and legal rights."

WHAT THE CITY SAID:  "… nothing in the ... Ordinance’s objectives treats religious assemblies or institutions less well than secular assemblies or institutions that are similarly situated as to the regulatory purpose. Although the Ordinance contains only RCB owned property, that fact alone is not enough to prove a violation of RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision. ….Plaintiff’s failure to identify any property which is similarly situated to the OLOH site and better-treated, in regard to the objectives of the OLOH Ordinance and the purposes of the Historic Districts Act, is fatal to plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims...

…Plaintiff argues that the OLOH Ordinance violates the RLUIPA because it “targeted the Our Lady of Hope Church”, “is but a single-parcel” and “improperly ‘targets’ only church property owned by the RCB.” As previously discussed plaintiff closed the OLOH church, ceased religious exercises on the OLOH site and relocated the Parish to a different part of Springfield. The creation of the OLOH Historic District followed a statutorily prescribed process aimed at preserving the significant architectural features existing on the OLOH site which seemed to be potentially threatened with destruction by the plaintiff.

The last church to be closed in Springfield was St. Joseph’s Church located on East Columbus Avenue. Although listed on the National Register of Historic Places, it was sold to a developer and demolished for a strip commercial complex.  This proposed local historic district is being proposed to avoid the same possible fate for Our Lady of Hope.”...

…The creation of local historic districts is aimed at preserving exterior architectural features of significant historic properties located within the commonwealth. The preservation of such properties does not have any religious motivation whatsoever  …..since there is no evidence in the record from which it may be reasonably inferred that Springfield established the OLOH Historic District in order to discriminate against the Catholic religion, plaintiff’s RLUIPA discrimination claims fails as a matter of law."

WHAT THE JUDGE SAID:
  "Plaintiff also alleges that the Ordinance infringes on its rights by targeting property owned by Plaintiff, a religious institution. Because the Ordinance singles out Plaintiff’s property for disparate treatment, Plaintiff argues that the Ordinance violates subsection (b)(1) of RLUIPA, the Equal Terms provision.

Subsection (b)(1) provides that “[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1). The federal courts of appeals agree that a plaintiff need not establish a substantial burden to bring a claim under RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision.....

The First Circuit has not as yet taken a position on these issues, and the facts of this case require none to be taken here. Plaintiff presents no evidence of unequal treatment as compared to any secular comparator, whether similarly situated or not.....Plaintiff objects to the City’s creation of a single-parcel district that applies only to property owned by a religious institution, referring to it as a form of discriminatory  “reverse spot zoning.” At first glance, this argument has some appeal. In this case, however, first impressions are misleading.

Plaintiff’s argument mirrors one that the Supreme Court has flatly rejected, albeit within the context of a Takings claim....there is nothing nefarious about a municipality’s decision to apply the Act to a single parcel of land. In doing so, the City has recognized that Plaintiff’s property contains unique characteristics that hold significant social and historical value.

Plaintiff next argues that the Ordinance violates RLUIPA’s nondiscrimination mandate, which states, “No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation that discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion or religious denomination.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2). Plaintiff lumps this violation into the same count (Count Eight) as its Equal Terms argument and makes no attempt to distinguish these provisions. Furthermore, the nondiscrimination provision sets a higher bar for plaintiffs by requiring evidence that the government action was motivated by (“on the basis of”) religion.

Plaintiff does, at one point, suggest that Defendants yielded to the concerns of disgruntled parishioners, who feared the possibility of the church’s demolition, and imposed historic status on the church to appease them. Plaintiff argues “the implications of that conduct . . . may [create] a disputed issue of fact.”

This argument is unavailing. First, it is not clear how such considerations demonstrate discriminatory animus. Second, Plaintiff presents no evidence to substantiate its claim that these considerations played a role in the Commission’s decision to propose this Ordinance to the City Council. Third, the Commission’s report is replete with information justifying its decision based on rational, objective criteria. Consequently, there is no genuine issue as to whether Defendants harbored some form of discriminatory animus in passing the Ordinance. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Without such evidence, Plaintiff’s argument fails, and Defendants’ motion will be allowed as to Count Eight."

(to be continued)

The Bishop Gets a "Shellacking" (Counts 9-12)

 Count 9

WHAT THE BISHOP SAID:  Count 9-Violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act of 2000. Substantial Burden on Religious Exercise
"Defendants, under color of state law, have deprived and continue to deprive the RCB of its right to the free exercise of religion - as secured by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act - by imposing and implementing a land use regulation that imposes a substantial burden on the RCB's religious exercise. Defendants' actions were purposely taken with deliberate indifference to the RCB's constitutional and legal rights."

WHAT THE CITY SAID:  "... A RLUIPA plaintiff “bears the burden of persuasion” on whether the challenged laws, or Springfield’s “application of those laws” to plaintiff “substantially burdens its exercise of religion.” Since the OLOH Historic District Ordinance does not impose a “substantial burden” on “religious exercise” plaintiff cannot carry its RLUIPA burden of proof.

... Unlike traditional zoning the Historic District Act and the OLOH Ordinance strive to preserve from unlawful alteration the existing features of property…

… In an attempt to invoke RLUIPA, plaintiff describes the process it generally follows when selling its property to a third part:
an agreement must be reached between the Bishop and the purchaser that any religious symbols may not be desecrated or put to a sordid use. If such an accommodation cannot be reached, all religious symbols are removed from the interior and exterior building. This would involve the removal of all exterior Christian crosses and stained glass windows depicting religious symbols or scenes. Where it is either impossible or impractical to remove religious symbols from the building  exterior (a frieze or carvings of sacred scripture) such symbols are covered with concrete or other suitable material to prevent desecration. In some instances, in order to make certain that religious symbols or expressions are not desecrated, such items must be properly destroyed.

Nothing in the OLOH Ordinance prevents plaintiff from applying to the Springfield Historical Commission for a certificate to conduct these types of activities. The historical designation of the OLOH exterior architectural features does not transform the sale of the closed OLOH property, which was formerly used as a place of worship, into any form of “religious exercise” under RLUIPA. Plaintiff’s title to the OLOH property, or even its incidental use for religious purposes, would not convert plaintiff’s secular plan for the property, selling it, into a religious exercise protected by RLUIPA. In this regard RLUIPA’s legislative history is enlightening:The right to assemble for worship is at the very core of the free exercise of religion...

The right to sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of space which is no longer needed or used for religious exercises is not at the core of the free exercise of religious; it is not even on its periphery. Disposition of unneeded property is common commercial secular activity without any religious significance. RLIUPA does not protect such secular activities even when they are conducted by religious institutions...

…Plaintiff complains that the mere enactment of the Historic District Ordinance creates ... a “substantial burden" under RLUIPA. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contentions, the Ordinance is not a substantial burden on plaintiff’s exercise of religion. The creation of the OLOH Historic District did not impose a significantly great restriction or onus on any exercise of plaintiff’s religion. It did not force plaintiff to choose between following the precepts of the Catholic religion and ownership of the OLOH Property. It did not force plaintiff to abandon the precepts of the Catholic religion or forfeit title to the OLOH property. Creation of the OLOH Historic District did not put pressure on plaintiff to modify his religious behavior or violate his religious beliefs. The ordinance merely submits the plaintiff to the same restrictions that any other landowner in a local historic district must fact. The plaintiff is not entitled to special government treatment that would violate the Establishment Clause.

Plaintiff speculates that, at some time in the future, it could face “delay, expense and uncertainly” from the mere filing for a certificate with the Springfield Historic Commission. This minor responsibility is a normal incident of property ownership in a historic district; it is not substantial under RLUIPA…

Plaintiff’s brief cites that the provision of fines from $10 to $500 dollars under section thirteen of the Historic District Act is evidence of a “substantial burden”. However, there is nothing in the Historic Ordinance or state statute that singles out anyone for special burdens on the basis of religious callings. It appears that plaintiff is simply averse to complying with the ordinance’s requirements…

WHAT THE JUDGE SAID:
  "Subsection (a) of RLUIPA reads as follows: "No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution  (A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest."

......Because there is no dispute that the Ordinance imposes a “land use regulation,” the only remaining issue under this provision is whether “historic district” status creates a “substantial burden” on Plaintiff’s free exercise of religion. This is often the most contentious part of the RLUIPA analysis; RLUIPA does not define the phrase “substantial burden.” However, RLUIPA’s legislative history clarifies that a substantial burden “must be established ‘by reference to Supreme Court jurisprudence’ under the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment.” ... The Supreme Court “made clear in other contexts that the ‘substantial burden’ hurdle is high and that the issue is intensely fact-specific.”...
Here, it is unnecessary to decide what constitutes a “substantial burden” because the burden imposed by complying with the Historic Districts Act is, on the undisputed facts of record, de minimis.

Plaintiff alleges that filing for a certificate of exemption will result in “delay, uncertainty and expense,” ...but Plaintiff fails to offer any evidence to substantiate that claim......Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he application process is not an insignificant one,” noting that the process requires the submission of “plans, elevations, specifications, material and other information.” ...These allegations are vague and conclusory and are insufficient to demonstrate a substantial burden...

The court’s “substantial burden” analysis makes understandable the requirement that plaintiffs file “one meaningful application” with a municipal body before filing suit. ... (“[T]he filing of one meaningful application will ordinarily be a necessary, although not alone sufficient, precondition for invoking the futility exception.”). If Plaintiff had presented one application, then the record would contain some concrete evidence of the burden imposed. Here, there is no evidence even of discussions. In these circumstances the court is obliged to conclude that no sufficient evidence of burden has been offered...

...In sum, Plaintiff has not shown that the administrative burden thrust upon it by virtue of its property’s inclusion within a historic district was anything more than an inconvenience. Because this claim falls far short of the standard ... Defendant’s motion will be allowed as to Count Nine.

Count 10

WHAT THE BISHOP SAID:
Count 10-Violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act of 2000. Unreasonable Limitation
"Defendants, under color of state law, have deprived and continue to deprive the RCB of its right to the free exercise of religion - as secured by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act - by imposing and implementing a land use regulation that unreasonably limits religious expression within a jurisdiction.  Defendants' actions were purposely taken with deliberate indifference to the RCB's constitutional and legal rights."

WHAT THE CITY SAID:
  "Plaintiff argues that RLUIPA’s exclusions and limits provisions “are not limited to cases of total exclusion of a religious practice from a jurisdiction. They may exist where a city acts arbitrarily or discriminatorily or where it simply deprives churches of reasonable opportunities to practice their religion.” That proposition has no application in this case.

First, it is undisputed that the OLOH Historic District Ordinance does not totally exclude the Catholic religion from Springfield. It was the plaintiff, not Springfield, which closed the OLOH church and transferred its assets elsewhere. Second, the exclusions and limits provisions in RLUIPA do not expressly address religious practices. It deals specifically with land use regulations which unreasonably limit “religions assemblies, institutions, or structures within a jurisdiction. In this case there is absolutely no evidence of any kind that the OLOH Ordinance unreasonably limits any religion or religious assemblies, institution, or structures within Springfield. Indeed the undisputed facts of the case are that after plaintiff closed the “our Lady of Hope Church… the Parish was merged with St. Mary’s Parish, East Springfield, under a new name, St. Mary Mother of Hope Parish.” Thus, the …unreasonable exclusions and limits provisions in RLUIPA do not apply in this case."

WHAT THE JUDGE SAID:  "Plaintiff also brings a cause of action under subsection (b)(3)(B) of RLUIPA, which states that “[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation that . . . unreasonably limits religious assemblies, institutions, or structures within a jurisdiction.”

Plaintiff offers no extended argument regarding subsection (b)(3)(B) in its Memorandum, (Dkt. No. 15, Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 32.), and for good reason: nothing in the Ordinance in any way “limits religious assemblies, institutions, or structures within a jurisdiction.” Thus, the provision is clearly inapplicable to these facts, and Defendants’ motion will be allowed as to Count Ten."

Count 11 

WHAT THE BISHOP SAID: Count 11-Violation of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. "By their actions, the defendants have, by its coercive and intimidating actions in interfering with and regulating the internal religious affairs and resources of the RCB, violated the RCB's rights to freedom of religion, conscience, assembly, speech and expression, and the unlawful establishment of religion, under the Constitutions of the United States and Massachusetts. Defendants' actions were purposely taken with deliberate indifference to the RCB's constitutional and legal rights."

WHAT THE CITY SAID: "The City is not a person under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA). Massachusetts courts have indicated that a municipality is not a “person” within the terms of the MCRA and, as such, cannot be sued under the statute. . . . that claim must be dismissed in its entirely and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on such claims . . ."

WHAT THE JUDGE SAID: "Count Eleven asserts a violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, §11I. Because “a municipality is not a ‘person’ covered by the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act,” see Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 591-92 (2001), and because all claims against the Individual Defendants are dismissed, Defendants’ motion will be allowed as to Count Eleven."

Count 12 

WHAT THE BISHOP SAID: Count 12-Declaratory Judgment G.L.c.231A
"The RCB, for the reasons alleged, submits that the court should declare the defendant's actions in approving, enacting and enforcing the Our Lady of Hope Historic District Ordinance are unlawful and contrary to the Constitutions of the United States and Massachusetts, and other provisions of federal and state law."

WHAT THE CITY SAID:
n/a

WHAT THE JUDGE SAID: "Count Twelve does not state a cause of action but rather contains a prayer for relief based on the Massachusetts Declaratory Judgment Act. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231(A). Thus, Defendants’ motion will be allowed as to Count Twelve."

-- the end --

Bishop McDonnell Explains. 4.

"...in the City of Springfield  the RCB, at its request, has previously been specifically exempted from coverage of a historic district. That exemption has been upheld by the Supreme Judicial Court (Springfield Preservation Trust)." (paper 28, p. 2)

"The Supreme Court has broadly defined expressive conduct as that which is inherently expressive  because it is "overwhelmingly apparent" to a reasonable observer that one is viewing a form of symbolic speech....clearly, the  RCB has placed freedom of expression front and center as an RCB constitutional right infringed upon by this ordinance, in addition to the RCB's free exercise of religion rights. As a hybrid rights case, Employment Div. v. Smith does not apply." (28, p. 6)

"The City fails to grasp the simple point that the closing of the site for worship in effect triggers the RCB's religious obligation to protect its religious symbols under Canon Law and sacred scripture...a frieze on a church exterior depicting the Madonna and Child owned by the Church is, as a matter of religious belief in the Catholic faith, sacred and cannot be allowed to be used in a fashion that might be considered sordid." (28, p. 8)

"In its complaint, RCB included allegations of particular actions by the individual defendants tending to show that they purposefully targeted RCB  as a religious entity because of its religiously-motivated decision to close the OLOH Parish and to discontinue regular worship services at OLOH Church contrary to the wishes of many parishioners. The implications of that conduct, which may be a disputed issue of fact, clearly go to the liability of the individual defendants regardless of whether such intentions or conduct should be imputed to the City...accordingly...the claims against those individuals should not be dismissed at this state of the litigation." (29, p. 3)

"The Ordinance exercises government control over RCB's scriptural inscriptions and sacred symbols...by prohibiting their removal, replacement, covering or reuse elsewhere unless the City...decides that such action may be allowed. This exercise of control prevents the Bishop's exercise of his religious obligations to protect these features from inappropriate use and to continue their use elsewhere when possible. These are substantial harms." (29, p. 7)

"Even if an exemption could be obtained, this aspect of the Ordinance does not remedy the Ordinance’s constitutional infirmities; if anything, this aspect further infringes on RCB’s rights. Obligating the RCB to seek such relief violates its constitutional rights. The process offered is that upon receipt of a proper application, the City, through the Springfield Historical Commission, will then evaluate whether the RCB’s religious reasons for seeking an exemption are “appropriate” or constitute a sufficient “hardship” to outweigh the government’s interest in historic preservation. This clearly entangles the City and ultimately the courts in valuing the RCB’s religious beliefs. Such conduct is something First Amendment jurisprudence clearly prohibits government from doing."
(29, p.9)

Bishop McDonnell Explains. 3.

". . . to qualify as "religious exercise" under RLUIPA, the practice need not be "compelled by, or central to, a  system of religious belief." (Mintz). . . placing these exterior religious symbols, all rooted in sacred scriptures, under government control through the creation of a single-parcel OLOH Historic District - containing only RCB owned buildings and enacted as a political response to the outcry of parishioners upset by the parish closing - essentially freezes in place these religious symbols and makes it impossible for the Bishop to exercise his responsibilities under Church doctrine, scripture and Canon Law to otherwise relocate them to other Catholic or Christian based locations, or to prevent their desecration or other sordid use by obliteration or destruction. To exclude from RLUIPA's protections the Bishop's ecclesiastical goods obligations under church law would require a narrow rather than broad interpretation of "religious exercise" under the statute." (13.2, p. 7)

". . .a "substantial burden," (under RLUIPA) is one which "places more than an inconvenience on religious exercise" and is "akin to significant pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly."  (Mintz quoting Midrash) (paper 13.2, p. 8)

"The Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield (RCB) is a corporation sole created by Chapter 368 of The Acts of the Massachusetts General Court of 1898 . . . The RCB is the legal entity through which the Roman Catholic Diocese of Springfield exercises its religious mission within the four Western Massachusetts Counties." (16, p. 1)

"Pastoral Planning Committee activities were an integral part of the religious mission of the Diocese. Its membership underwent a four-day retreat for formation purposes before beginning their work. The study and deliberations were always undertaken following prayer and meditation seeking God's guidance in their actions." (16, p. 4)

"By the decree of closure, the assets of the parish of OLOH were transferred to St. Mary Mother of Hope Parish. The effect of that decree was to place the Church out of service with respect to religious worship and to place on the Bishop...the religious obligation to protect all religious details and religious ornamentation on the buildings so that the original intent and purpose of these religious symbols can be maintained." (16, p. 5)

"These architectural details are overtly religious in nature and are expressions and reflections by the RCB of the Roman Catholic faith and are explicitly and deliberately designed to communicate and identify the structure to all as a  Roman Catholic Church, to praise God and to exhort those who see it, whether Roman Catholic or not, to reflect upon Jesus Christ and the Word and Glory of God." (16, p. 6)

"...the exterior stain glass windows...sculptures, inscriptions from sacred scripture, reliefs and friezes...are sacred symbols of the Roman Catholic Church, and thus, the Bishop is religiously bound by Church doctrine, scripture and Canon Law to determine the appropriate use of all such exterior religious symbols." (16, p. 7)

"The Code of Canon Law, c. 1254.1. provides: "The Catholic Church has the inherent right, independently of any secular power, to acquire, retain, administer and alienate temporal goods in pursuit of its proper objectives. Canon 1254.2. provides: "The proper objectives are principally the regulation of divine worship, the provision of fitting support of the clergy and other ministers, and carrying out of work of the sacred apostolate and of charity, especially for the needy." (16, p. 9)

"... the [historic district] designation was an unlawful intrusion into [the] Pastoral Planning process as evidenced by the fact that the proponents of the Ordinance were parish members who had expressed their unhappiness with the closing of the parish....." (16, p. 12)

"Since 1972 when the first historic district was designated in Springfield, the practice of the City of Springfield has been to exclude church property from such districts." (16, p. 17)